REPORT "PISANU" MAFIA-ON COLLISION POLICY ROME - "Over the years, culminating in the massacres of Mafia murders of judges Falcone and Borsellino, there was something very close to a deal between the state and Cosa Nostra." These are the considerations which it reached the President of the Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Commission, Giuseppe Pisanu, who illustrated the its report on "The great crimes and the massacres of the 1992-93 mafia." "It is reasonable to assume - he said - that in the season of great crimes and massacres there has been a convergence of interests between Cosa Nostra, other criminal organizations, the Masonic secret pieces diverted institutions, business and politics."
UNDERSTANDING - "But I think - wrote in his report the chairman of the Anti-Mafia Commission - that we can start from a preliminary, objective consideration: the frightening sequence of 1992-93 did so with a strategy of the mafia and terrorism, but produced different effects for if on the one hand this led to a loss of political-institutional as to cause concern to the Prime Minister in charge of the imminence of a coup, on the other side that led to a rise of repressive measures to induce the Cosa Nostra to review their choices and, ultimately, to take the away, so far no return, dell'inabissamento. In the space of this divergence is tangled interweaving between the mafia, politics, big business, occult, subversive groups and parts of the state that diverted more than once, and not just in those years, we have seen emerge from the bowels of the country. In reports by colleagues who have preceded us, emerges the need to constantly explore and understand the relationship from the beginning-political mafia. I intend to refer to those reports, but with a warning to me decisive. In the face of terrible events even less than that took place in Sicily, Florence, Milan and Rome, are juxtaposed, without melting, three truths: the judiciary, the political and historical one. They are based on research methods and sometimes on very different sources, with the consequence of giving rise to only partial and unsatisfactory results. This is inevitable in most cases. " The legal truth - said Pisanu - is contained in the investigation that led to the judgments of magistrates. They prevail in the gathering of evidence. This is a testimony, especially if he finds the guarantee from other persons. But this kind of truth leaves a bad taste in my mouth too scrupulous judges like the late Dr. Chelazzi: the magistrate may in fact find evidence of the guilt of a defendant, but impose a sentence no longer means making light, since they can remain shadow is in the general context is the internal connections of a criminal matter. Not to mention that the confessions of the defendants, beginning with repentance, they are often functional to grasp and take advantage of conveniences such as reduction of sentences or better prison conditions. The political truth - he continues - is one in which all of us are committed to try to explain to our constituents and to all Italians who ran the dangers of democracy in the years 1992-'93, and how we can prevent the recurrence of these deadly risks. The historical truth should be able to combine the political and judicial truth and establish a less partial and limited both. But even in this case, you should not encourage unrealistic. Historians working on archives and documents are also incomplete, biased, pre-selected. Until a decade ago, the archives of the police headquarters in Palermo were not available. When he fell the time constraint that made them inaccessible, historians have found that the mafia of all ranks, and at the end of the nineteenth and twentieth century, 'talking', were confronted and exchanged favors, established arrangements with informers, police officers and Quaestor. Whether or not they were 'negotiating' everyone is free to judge. We must also remember - Pisanu added - the same sources used by historians are the result of prior selection by those who pay documents to the Archives of the State, why not do it blindly, but carefully, keeping to himself that the materials deemed most sensitive in order to protect the public interest. "
DALL'ADDAURA the massacres - "Thanks to its features - watch the president Pisanu - the failed attempt all'Addaura can properly be regarded as the prologue of great crimes and massacres of the Mafia in 1992-93. As is well known June 21, 1989 in front of the villa on the cliffs inhabited by the judge Giovanni Falcone in all'Addaura promenade of Palermo, were found by agents of the stock diving equipment and a sports bag containing 58 sticks of explosives commanders distanza.Erano guests Dr . magistrates Falcone Swiss Carla Del Ponte and Charles Lehmann investigating facts on drugs and organized crime, which was responsible for the same territorial jurisdiction Dr. Falcone. Palermo was the target of the court, which has become the main reference point for all those who contrasted the Mafia organization. Its elimination would take physical a high symbolic value, punitive and preventative at the same time. The news of the scandal stirred up, controversy and even suspicion, maybe mafia of origin, a staging desired by the same Dr. Falcone. At the time the investigation is redirected to a command from the sea aboard a raft. But the hypothesis is questioned by recent statements of regret that Fontana has reconstructed in detail the facts assigning liability to some mobsters, including Anthony Madonia who had a house in the vicinity. Dell'Addaura The attack, however, is referred to in the Judgement of the Court of Palermo on April 4, 1996 condemning Dr. Bruno Contrada, already SISDE leader, for having facilitated the escape of the Professional Oliviero Tognoni, a recycler of proceeds of drug trafficking on behalf of the Mafia. He was investigated by the Swiss prosecutor Carla Del Ponte in Italy and by the investigating judge Giovanni Falcone who had interrogated several times together. Ms. Del Ponte also could therefore be included in the objective of the bombers. On stage dell'Addaura was also assumed that there are two agents of the State Police, Augustine Anthony and Emanuele Piazza, probably external collaborators of the intelligence services and security, and that a third agent called 'monster face'. A character similar to the latter was described by his father Augustine Agent who suspected as a possible accomplice in the killing of his son. The killing of Piazza would instead be ascribed to 'Cosa Nostra'. The tragic death of both agents different fuels speculation, but the present state of investigations is not possible to define their position and act in deductions. However, among so many ups and downs, now we can understand better the expression of Mr. Falcone, that 'refined minds' had developed the criminal plan. " LIMA
MURDER AND KILLING CAPACITY - "Two years later, March 12, 1992 - Pisanu continues in its report the Anti-Mafia Commission - is murdered, with a classic mafia ambush, Hon. Salvo Lima, a lawmaker and influential member of the European Christian Democrats. Thus began the sequence of very serious criminal acts of deliberate self-governing bodies 'Cosa Nostra' that bloodied Italy until the end of 1993, deeply disturbing public opinion and order holding of democratic life. The judiciary has clearly identified the instigators, the perpetrators and the motive for this crime. Lima was 'punished' as the main representative of the political group that the Sicilian had been unable to secure the necessary safeguards to the 'maxi-trial': the historical event record created by Falcone that, for the first time, had stripped the organization and working methods of the Cosa Nostra, threatened the very survival. The need to mitigate the results of the maxi-trial and the anti-mafia legislation constituted an obsession with Riina, the reason for triggering of political revenge, murder and the attack of the state. " "It is from there - passing Pisanu said the killing of Falcone - a fierce determination to May 23, 1993 was accomplished the Capaci massacre, which killed Giovanni Falcone, his wife Francesca Morvillo and escort Montinaro Antonio Rocco Di Cillo and Vito Schifani. The responsibilities of the crime of murder are been clearly identified and entered the top of 'Cosa Nostra'. In particular, it affirmed the responsibility of both the 'Regional Commission' and the 'Provincial Commission of Palermo', this implements the so-called 'theorem Buscetta' according to which there is full sharing of great crimes, as they correspond to the realization and the protection of vital interests of the organization. The motive of the massacre was embodied in the extraordinary personality of Mr. Falcone, at that time the holder of an office high-profile institutional and, before that, the protagonist of procedural measures that had led the mob to big defeat the maxi-trial. But despite the solid truth procedural question is, as noted in this hall the PNA Piero Grasso, because Cosa Nostra has never given up the attempt to assassinate Dr. Falcone easily in Rome and has instead preferred the solution much more complex and Capaci risky. It was only a show of military power? Or there were other motivations, such as, for example, suggests the disappearance of files from the computer of Mr. Falcone, Ministry of Justice? ".
the massacre of Via D'Amelio - "almost identical, both in setting mafia-terrorist, is running - continued the President of the Anti-Mafia Commission - is the 'massacre of Via D'Amelio'. On 19 July 1992, a violent explosion occurs in Palermo Via Mariano D'Amelio, causing the death of Paolo Borsellino, deputy prosecutor at the District Attorney of the Republic of Palermo, and escort Claudio Traina, Emanuela Loi, Agostino Catalano, Vincenzo Li Muli and Eddie Walter Cosina, as well as the wounding of many people and a general destruction of other property. The most serious attack produced the education of three different processes referred to as 'a Borsellino', 'Borsellino bis' and 'b Borsellino'. The first stems from the findings Technical sull'autobomba used for the attack and led quickly to the man who had commissioned the theft of the same car, Vincenzo Scarantino, the garage owner who had guarded and packed with TNT, Giuseppe Orofino, the technician checked the phone that he would ' user telephone family Borsellino, Pietro Scotto, and all "man of honor ', Salvatore Prophet, who would handle the preparatory phase of the attack. After his arrest and a prison term, the Scarantino began to collaborate with the justice system and among the accusations, retractions, confirmations and denials, made it possible to investigate also the two subsequent processes. Ultimately, in the first trial he was sentenced to life imprisonment Only the Prophet, while in the second and third were sentenced to life imprisonment and the other executors of the principals, all belonging to the Mafia and the military 'commission of the Cosa Nostra'. The motive was identified, albeit with some reservations, in two key areas: the revenge against one of the magistrates involved more effectively against 'Cosa Nostra', the prevention of any investigations against Paolo Borsellino was also underway regarding the death of his dearest friend Giovanni Falcone. Both lines can reconnect with the Capaci massacre because, as evidenced by various statements, the two murders had been approved jointly by 'What Our 'since the early eighties. That said - Pisanu noted - should be immediately clear that some fundamental aspects of the massacre are still unclear. In fact, the statements Spatuzza and parallel retraction of Scarantino have disrupted the initial reconstruction of the scene. To date we do not know the composition of the commando stragista, we know very little about the origin of the explosive used, the 'T4 or PETN plastic', and finally death seems the "red diary 'which, according to family members, the court inquired Borsellino and placed in the bag before going in Via D'Amelio. I note, however, that the new, more reliable reconstruction shifting the focus of the massacre of the mafia family boss Aglieri to that of Brancaccio, led by brothers Gravano, who have been convicted for the murders mainland in 1993. This confirms the continuity of the line of the Cosa Nostra stragista imposed by the dominant component and more violent than Riina, Bagarella, Brusca, and Madonia, precisely, the brothers grave. "
"The first investigations on Via D'Amelio - President Pisanu continued killing of Paolo Borsellino - have suffered significant forcing even by officials of the State Police related to the Secret Service. Now the question arises of whether these arose from the anxiety of forcing investigators to give a satisfying response to the public or upset if it arose from a deliberate purpose of screening. There are, at least for now, documented answers. On stage, however, reappear the shadows of the Secret Service. First of all, that of Dr. Lorenzo Narracci, who collaborated with Dr. Contrada, as an official of SISDE in Palermo, still in service to AISI, and apparently investigated in Caltanissetta. Gaspare Spatuzza him vaguely recognized photography as an outsider to the Cosa Nostra, while Massimo Ciancimino, a witness rather than discussed, he stated as a companion of the mysterious Mr. Franco and Carlo that he would assiduously followed his father Vito Ciancimino during the so-called 'Negotiation' between state and 'Cosa Nostra'. On the massacre in Via D'Amelio and the subsequent developments, the 'deal' had a significant impact. It is not easy to measure the flow rate because of the secrecy of ongoing investigations. As is known, it would be held between the then Colonel DC Mario Mori and his colleague Captain Giuseppe De Donno, on the one hand, and the former Mayor of Palermo Vito Ciancimino other. According to the prevailing view on the first contact was established in the space of time between the massacres of Capaci and Via D'Amelio and that lasted until December of 1992, virtually until the eve of the arrest of Riina took place January 16 next. Of these contacts - that their intentions were in investigating a daring operation - some authorities informed the two officers and institutional level. According to the hypothesis accusatory instead they entered into a genuine negotiation whereby 'Cosa Nostra' put an end to the massacres and get, in return, measures favorable to the organization. E 'likely - Pisanu notes - that Ciancimino has emphasized its role as a mediator between the Mafia and institutions with the idea of \u200b\u200bpersonal advantage from both sides. It is equally likely that the initiative of the Officers has been perceived by Cosa Nostra as the sign of the availability of areas of the institutions to come to terms with it, thus giving the impression to strike again to subdue any resistance. Brusca and Hooks say that Riina was wanting to up the tempo of the massacre in Via D'Amelio, so as to provide for the postponement of execution, already approved, important political figures. Judge Borsellino had now become the number one enemy of the Cosa Nostra and, moreover, would certainly have been contrary to the treaty: he was therefore a top priority. It must be said that the State's response was immediate and harsh, the exact opposite of what they could expect Cosa Nostra. Even in the hours immediately after the massacre, the Minister of Grace Martelli and Justice ordered the reopening of the prisons and transport Pianosa el'Asinara from Sicily around 250 'men of honor' to serve the sentence under the 41 bis. The next day, July 20, 1992, the same Minister, issue 325 other enforcement activities of 41a annually. On August 7, is rapidly converted into law the so-called Decree Martelli who had previously met with much resistance. Two months later, namely on 1 November 1992 are issued additional 567 enforcement of 41a with deadlines in November 1993 and January 1994. "
EXCEPT MURDER - "But the Cosa Nostra does not stop. Two months later - continues in his report the chairman of the Anti-Mafia Commission - is killed in Casteldaccia (PA) Ignazio Salvo, a powerful tax collector in Sicily, already arrested in 1984 with his cousin Nino for Mafia association. It 'another act of reckoning, which had already struck Lima and targeted several politicians, all guilty of having failed to save' Cosa Nostra 'from the devastating effects of the maxi-trial. But the individual performances are already planned for cancellations open the most bloody and politically subversive: that the production of indiscriminate terror across the country, with deadly attacks on artistic and cultural heritage. The sequence of seven operations stragista, concentrated with the top five in the space of just three months, has no precedent in Italy. " Pisanu reconstructs the events of that time: "At 21:40 on 14 May 1993 a bomb explodes at the intersection of Via Ruggero Faure and Via Boccioni in Rome soon after the passage of the car known presenter Maurizio Costanzo is fortunately unharmed. The blast injuring 24 people and damaging several vehicles and buildings. At 1.00 am on 27 May 1993 a violent explosion in Florence in Via dei Georgofili destroys a wing of the Tower of fleas, and other historic buildings nearby. Killed a traffic policeman Nencioni Fabrizio, his wife Angela, daughters Nadia and Catherine, the university student Dario Capolicchio. The wounded 37. At the Uffizi Gallery damage is very serious: three paintings forever lost and 173 damaged, 42 with 16 statues and busts. At 23:14 of the July 27, 1993 another powerful explosion in Via Palestro Milan, causes extensive damage to the Pavilion of Contemporary Art, the vehicles and surrounding buildings. Firefighters were killed Alessandro Ferrari, Carlo Pasotti, Swiss and Sergio, the traffic policeman Stefano Picerno Driss Moussafir immigrant. The wounded 12. At 23:58 of the July 27, 1993 a bomb explodes in the Piazza San Giovanni in Laterano in Rome, damaging the walls of the Basilica and the Lateran Palace, and the vehicles stationary or in transit nearby. A few minutes, a second explosion damaged the church of San Giorgio in Velabro in Rome, the surrounding buildings and vehicles parked or in transit. On 23 January 1994, a "Lancia Thema" padded with more than 120 kilograms of explosive is placed in the avenue of Gladiators in Rome, near the Olympic, at a point where at the end of public sports events, buses of the transit police service in the stadium. The car does not explode to the defective functioning of the mechanism of activation of the charge. On April 14, 1994 Finally, in Formello (Roma) is found a large quantity of explosives concealed on the side of Via Formellese, where the employee usually goes to Justice Salvatore Contorno who lives there. I note that the explosive used by Faure Street on is the same as Via D'Amelio: The plastic 'T4 or PETN'. Manufactured in Austria, United Kingdom, Sweden and the United States, 'T4' is not for sale in Italy and have included only our Armed Forces. Cosa Nostra had it in large amounts: in the first five episodes have just called it detonated 670 kg All of these facts, whose connection was obvious after a few days, were considered before the Court of Assizes of Florence, a city in which the massacre had caused the highest number of casualties. The new strategy of type terrorist attacks, indiscriminate attacks based on running out of Sicily, mainly against the national artistic heritage - concluded Pisanu - had, as a clarification process, the following immediate objectives: the repeal of the penal law with the isolation prison of the mafia; closing some prisons 'special' (Pianosa el'Asinara) sterilization of the legislation on 'collaborators of justice', the degradation of culture antimafia by removing his supporters considered a journalist. "
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS - In his final remarks to the report for the Commission Anti-Mafia President Pisanu riconsiera the facts "in light of the new elements that have emerged in different ways over the past two years." "The turning point of the political-military strategy of the Sicilian Mafia - he writes - is, therefore, 30 January 1992, when the Court of Cassation, the final answer to 'maxi-trial', rejects all appeals of the defense policy of dedicating the implicit responsibility of the 'Commission', the self-governing body of the Cosa Nostra. There he stops long 'pax mafia' started in the second half of the '80s and 'Cosa Nostra' immediately presents the bill to those who had not been able to protect the Association from the judicial storm. Salvatore Riina and his 'honorable men' did not matter whether the traditional referents, as Salvo Lima, had really done everything possible to keep the promises that mattered was simply that they were no longer able to discharge their duties at a crucial time for the life of the organization. Having exhausted their function, were no longer to live. It served, however, their death and that of those who, like judges Falcone and Borsellino, were on the opposite side, the main protagonists of the historic 'maxi-trial'. Seemed to vanish as the myth of his invincibility and impunity, these deaths had to prove to everyone that 'Cosa Nostra' was and remained, however, stronger than its enemies and also powerful friends who had turned their backs, strong enough to launch the state a reckless challenge. The strategic change 'Cosa Nostra' and the root of terrorist-subversive were taken immediately by the security chiefs. Already during the hearing of 11 June 1993 - Pisanu remember - the Chief of Police Prefect Parisi said to our committee: '(...) the involvement of mafia in recent criminal operations ... situabile that does not appear in a drawing even wider where macroscopic interests illicit profit system, management of agreements with other components and delinquent business, national and international, emerging with any evidence (...) '. Recently, former President of the Republic Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, said during an interview that in those days, the prefect of Paris' held in great regard to a report of the Mossad, according to which the world of the extreme right there was a strong push to destabilize the Italian situation, pointing also to the resignation of the Head of State '. In turn, Dr.. Gianni De Gennaro, then Director of the DIA, while acknowledging the context of the mafia massacre Via d'Amelio, could see 'evidence from to suspect that the whole project was not subversive of the exclusive management of the vertices of the Cosa Nostra, but that also might have contributed to other members of a larger criminal power. It was indeed evident in the Borsellino killing a clear anomaly in the traditional mafia behavior, who prefers to define their criminal actions so as to achieve maximum results with minimum damage, the crime had in fact been given every time that instead of accelerating the irresistible 'reactive action of the institutions, with a consequent and apparent damage to the criminal organization'. The analysis of Parisi and De Gennaro will subsequently repeated confirmations in judicial offices. "
"E 'therefore reasonable to assume - continues Pisanu - that in the season of great crimes and massacres there has been a convergence of interests between Cosa Nostra, other criminal organizations, the Masonic secret pieces diverted institutions, business and policy. This attitude has to enter in different combinations in the history of the mafia, and above all is the very nature of the Bourgeoisie mafia. Think about the failure of the coup Junio \u200b\u200bValerio Borghese, the fake kidnapping of Michele Sindona, director Pippo Calo in the massacre of the 'fast 804'. That story tells us, in the familiar statement Buscetta, that 'the mob does not take orders from no ', is autonomous. His guiding star is utilitarianism, which is the real interest of the organization. The same Giovanni Falcone had explained to us that there are 'third level' of any kind can influence or even determine the addresses of 'Cosa Nostra', and that assume the existence of the central crime, and large older puppeteers who from dictate the agenda or pull the ranks of the mafia, is to sin of 'intellectual crudity'. Probably in the days when these claims was considered premature to judge the general fund go to the mafia-political analysis of the relationship. However, they are still now an inescapable reminder for those of us has a duty to establish facts on their evaluations. Now it is quite clear, as agreed by the judges and was confirmed by the uncertain copy of the mysterious 'Papello', the main objective, the ultimate goal of practical massacres of 1992-'93 was to force the state to abolish 41 bis and resize all the activities of prevention and repression. It was a high-stakes, because the 41 bis, the regulation of collaborators of justice and that the seizure of criminal assets, and have had such a subversive force to blow up the internal structures of the mafia and disrupt the entire organization in the long run. For this 'Cosa Nostra' is or tries to deal with the state. Today we have news on two talks quite clear: the 'abnormal contours' between Mori and Ciancimino that perhaps was the turning of a daring investigative activity, and that between Bellini-Joey-Brusca-Riina, who was born from the idea of \u200b\u200battacking the artistic heritage of the State, having explained to his interlocutors that Bellini 'they killed a judge is replaced, killing a policeman is the same thing, but destroyed the Tower of Pisa, is destroyed something irreplaceable with incalculable harm to the State' (acts Court Florence Assizes). Recently, the then Minister of Justice reiterated that while Martelli the government was engaged in a confrontation with the mob 'there were other parts of the state than vice versa thought that things could be adjusted, if on the one hand, the mafia and renounced the terrorist strategy across the state out of my head the idea of \u200b\u200bbringing the final blow to Cosa Nostra '. For the former Minister Mancino there was no negotiation, 'we have always rejected ... as a simple idea of \u200b\u200beasing of the confrontation with the state carried out by the Mafia'. They are two different points of view and no less contradictory than it appears, because both emphasize the strangeness of the government to negotiate. But something - concludes Pisanu - we Cosa Nostra and was accompanied by the unprecedented displays of strength. "
"I want to report about it - says the chairman of the Anti-Mafia Commission - a unique correspondence of dates that is the case, since May of 1993, including the massacres on the mainland and the expiration of the three blocks 41a emitted into ' previous year. On May 27 a bomb exploded in Via dei Georgofili, less than a month after the end of the first measures taken by the Minister Martelli. It's the 'small blow ... to tease the other party' which spoke of Riina and Brusca? Or, in other words, a message intended to push for an application or restart a negotiation? The message, however, is not collected and in fact the 325 measures are extended by another year until 1994. On July 27 and 28 bombs explode in Milan and Rome and 'Cosa Nostra' takes an initiative unprecedented claims the attacks in style and raises the bar Brigades threatening a new massacre with the 'guarantee of hundreds of deaths'. Maybe it's the notice of the planned massacre at the Olympic Stadium which, fortunately, it will fail. Go ahead. On November 1, 1993 expires another block of steps 41a, but in the meantime 'Cosa Nostra' is silent. Unexpectedly, three days after that deadline, on 4 and 6 November, the Minister of Justice does not extend the 41a to 140 inmates in the prison dell'Ucciardone of Palermo. It can be inferred that the 'treaty-blackmail' has produced its effects between July 29 and November 6? It 'still possible that both the mafia organization had interpreted the withdrawal as a surrender or a concession by the State for the shocks and that, therefore, the campaign stragista were to go forward. Especially since 31 January 1994 would have expired the most important measure in listed some of the most authoritative boss 'Cosa Nostra': Gerlando Alberti, Bernardo Brusca, Pippo Calo, Stefano Boyfriends, James Gambino, Salvatore Greek, Luciano Liggio, Francesco Madonia, etc. .. This would strengthen if the date of attempted murder at the Olympic Stadium was as described by G. Spatuzza: namely, January 23, 1994, during the football match Roma-Udinese. Of course, these synchronicities to be treated with caution, because the continental massacres were planned well in advance. We must also consider that, according to the late Dr. Chelazzi, 'the purpose of the massacres is structured progressively with the drivers and other issues that have been added along the way', perhaps causing variations from the original program. In any case, the fact remains that there was the second withdrawal, that the massacre at the Olimpico was never attempted and that the State did not buckle. Indeed, went gradually intensifying prevention and law enforcement, activities that would become sustainable or to the center-left governments or with the center-right. "
"The season of terrible massacres - Pisanu continues in its conclusions - closed January 27, 1994 with the arrest of the brothers Gravano, the undisputed leaders of the more violent, and with the rise of the 'moderate' Bernardo Provenzano to the top Cosa Nostra. He will push the Mafia to do business, to be sinking ever deeper into the economy and society, silencing the weapons will be the end of 'viddani' Totò Riina, imprisoned and rendered impotent by the rigor of 41a. Even the simple narration of the facts suggests that there were interventions from outside the mafia in the planning and execution of the massacres. Since August of 1993, a report by the DIA, had seen and described 'a combination of horizontal', which includes, in addition to the Mafia, certain Masonic lodges of Palermo and Trapani, subversive groups on the right, officials of the State and infidels corrupt administrators. Along the same lines, while narrowing the field, Dr. Lari Caltanissetta prosecutor argued recently that Cosa Nostra was not 'other-directed to other entities', but the table of judgments have been found, next to mobsters, 'diversion of the institutional actors who have betrayed the state with the aim of destabilizing the country ... by providing a strategic and military know-how'. In July, the same Dr. Lari had anticipated that, following the statements of Spatuzza, 'the investigation has left the track purely mafia link to find out a pact between the bosses of the Cosa Nostra and the Secret Service'. Probably with Ciancimino Provenzano was a prominent figure in negotiations of this kind, while he was Riina, at least in part, in the mail. 'Negotiations' complex and still obscure, in which they entered in various ways, for convergence of interests, different subjects, but all have a real bargaining power to put on the plate. Otherwise 'Cosa Nostra' he would have refused. Precisely because of this apparent complexity, or guess, we must beware of making generalizations, simplifications such as: a testimony on 'hearsay' evidence needs goals el'accostamento arbitrary number of pieces of truth can give us, at most, only a guess. I refer particularly to the strictly political dimension of the negotiation and, in particular, to the political interests of the mafia in the period of the massacres. Killed, or threatened with death or abandoned its traditional referents, 'Cosa Nostra' was struggling to orient and build new alliances in a political context that, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, was already disintegrating under the blows of tangentopoli and those of the same murder. So much so that he sought a solution, building its own regional party, 'Sicilia Libera', which then sought to spend on the national political scene, still too confused and uncertain. Therefore, it is likely that following the arrest of the brothers and the defeat of the wing Graviano stragista, 'Cosa Nostra' has been adapted to the new order of Bernardo Provenzano has been put to the window, waiting for what would happen after Ciampi's resignation of the Government (January 13, 1994), the dissolved and early elections. Since then, the military arm locked, 'Cosa Nostra' has certainly kept his relationships, his business, his power. But since then he has lost almost all its major exponents, while in Sicily has greatly increased social opposition to the mafia that has its heroes and its civilian targets and carry out very close to the judiciary and the police. Even for this - the president concluded Pisanu - "Cosa Nostra" has perhaps given up the idea of \u200b\u200bface as an equal with the state, but it certainly has not given up politics. On the contrary, with the expansion of its economic power has always felt more the need to protect its business and its men. Especially with the instruments of urban policy, regional, national and European level. But at this point we enter the second phase of our program of work: the fight against mafia and Italian foreign economic and financial side: the new frontier antimafia.
